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The Case for "Higher Law"*
JOHN WARWICK MONTGOMERY**
Cardozo's essay on "Law and Literature"1 and Harvard juris-
prudent Lon Fuller's imaginary cases in the mythical jurisdiction
of Newgarth 2 offer adequate precedent for beginning with a fable.
Once upon a time a hare of philosophical temperament invited
a politically oriented fox to dinner. During the entree the hare
presented an interesting argument on the relativity of all law and
morals, stressing that each beast, in the final analysis, has a right
to his own legal system. The fox did not find this argument en-
tirely convincing on the intellectual level, but was much im-
* This article was originally presented as a guest lecture at the University of
Missouri School of Law at Kansas City.
** John Warwick Montgomery is a Member of the Virginia Bar and an inter-
nationally known Protestant theologian. He holds eight earned degrees, including
the Ph.D from the University of Chicago and the Doctorate of the University from
Strasbourg, France. In 1978 he received the Dipl6me cum laude in the interna-
tional and comparative law of human rights from the International Institute of
Human Rights (France). He is the author of thirty-two books, including The Shap-
ing of America (Minneapolis; Bethany), Law and Gospel (Oak Park, Ill.: Chris-
tian Legal Society), and Jurisprudence: A Book of Readings (Strasbourg:
International Scholarly Publishers). Biographical articles on him appear in Who's
Who in America, Who's Who in France, Who's Who in Europe, and Who's Who in
the World.
1. Cardozo, Law and Literature, 39 COLUM. L. REV. 119 (1939).
2. L. FULLER, THE PROBLEMS OF JURISPRUDENCE passim (1949). See also
Fuller, The Case of the Speluncean Explorers, 62 HARv. L. REV. 616 (1949).
pressed with it practically. For dessert he ate the rabbit: lapin .
la cr!me.
Moral: One's philosophical viewpoint can be of immense practi-
cal consequence, especially when the stakes (steaks?) are high.
I. THE NEED
First contact with the Code of Professional Responsibility of the
American Bar Association 3 is a moving experience; here is a doc-
ument reflecting genuine concern to hold high the ethical stand-
ards of a great profession. Closer perusal of the Code, however,
elicits a sense of growing disquiet. Not that the standards are
wrong, but what precisely do they mean at the points of funda-
mental ethical commitment? "A lawyer ... should be temperate
and dignified, and he should refrain from all illegal and morally
reprehensible conduct." 4 To question such affirmations would
seem, on one level, as sacrilegious as doubting Motherhood or the
Flag; but is this not precisely their danger? They use the right
words, but they do not define them; they continually beg the
question. Who, specifically, is to set the standards of "temper-
ance" and "dignity," and who is to say what conduct is indeed
"morally reprehensible"? The practical consequences of such
vagueness are most serious. A recent and penetrating analysis of
"Law Schools and Ethics" points out that the profession's stand-
ards do not, for example, make plain whether a lawyer need not
or must not "do for his client that which the lawyer thinks is un-
fair, unconscionable, or over-reaching, even if lawful." 5
Throughout the Code emphasis is placed upon conduct which
shall deserve the approval of peers. "[I]n the last analysis it is
the desire for the respect and confidence of the members of his
profession and of the society which he serves that should provide
to a lawyer the incentive for the highest possible degree of ethical
conduct. The possible loss of that respect and confidence is the
ultimate sanction."' 6 Here the dubious assumption is made that
3. The CODE was adopted by the House of Delegates of the ABA on August
12, 1976, to become effective on January 1, 1970; it was amended on February 24,
1970. The CODE enlarges upon and officially replaces the ABA's CANONS OF PRO-
FESSIONAL ETHICS, adopted in 1908 and subsequently amended.
4. ABA CODE OF PROFESSIONAL RESPONSIBILITY EC 1-5.
5. M.L. Schwartz, Law Schools and Ethics, CHRONICLE OF HIGHER EDUCATION
20 (Dec. 9, 1974); cf. ABA CANONS OF PROFESSIONAL ETHICS No. 15: The attorney
"must obey his own conscience and not that of his client." See also id. No. 18. But
what value system is to inform the attorney's conscience? "[NJ o client has a right
to demand that his counsel shall be illiberal, or that he do anything therein repug-
nant to his own sense of honor and propriety." Id. No. 24; cf. id. No. 44. "Illiberal"
by what criterion? "Honor" and "propriety" by whose definition?
6. ABA CODE OF PROFESSIONAL RESPONSIBILITY Preamble. See also ABA CA-
NONS OF PROFESSIONAL ETHICS No. 32.
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society will somehow maintain that undefined high standard of
which the Code speaks. The real possibility is never faced that
standards--even the standards of an entire society--can decline
or disappear. Interestingly enough, the Uniform Commercial
Code (hardly a document replete with philosophical insights) dis-
plays uncomfortable awareness of this grim possibility. In the
official comment relating to course of dealing and usage of trade
we read: "[T]he anciently established policing of usage by the
courts is continued to the extent necessary to cope with the situa-
tion arising if an unconscionable or dishonest practice should be-
come standard."7 The Watergate tragedy is an appalling example
of the ease with which societal standards can in fact deterio-
rate-and it is noteworthy that this occurred in an Administration
relying more than any previous one on the services of lawyers
and the legally trained.
How precisely correct was the judgment of the Supreme Court
in a case of personal influence upon public officials exactly one
hundred years before Watergate:
The foundation of a republic is the virtue of its citizens. They are at
once sovereigns and subjects. As the foundation is undermined, the struc-
ture is weakened. When it is destroyed, the fabric must fall. Such is the
voice of universal history. 1 Montesq. Spirit of Laws, 17....
If the instances [of selling influence to procure privately advantageous
legislation] were numerous, open, and tolerated, they would be regarded
as measuring the decay of the public morals and the degeneracy of the
times. No prophetic spirit would be needed to foretell the consequences
near at hand.8
When public morals decay and the times degenerate, of what con-
sequence is society's approval or reputation for ethical action? If
all Cretans are liars, is it a compliment to be praised by a Cretan?
And in such a situation, what is the individual or collective con-
science necessarily worth? Conscience is environmentally condi-
tioned, and the morals of the time will influence what is regarded
as conscionable or unconscionable. Among cannibals, one feels
guilty for not cleaning his plate.
The problem of establishing sound ethical standards in the le-
gal profession and the wider problem of which this is but one as-
pect-that of finding ethical norms for the evaluation of positive
law in general-becomes immensely more acute when we see to-
7. U.C.C. § 1-205, Comment 6.
8. Trist v. Child, 88 U.S. (21 Wall.) 441 (1874) (Swayne, J.).
tal societies operating with legal and ethical values directly op-
posed to our own. Solzhenitsyn, in The Gulag Archipelago,
eloquently and passionately condemns the dehumanization of the
individual in the juridical "sewage disposal system" of today's
Russia,9 and his argument has been documented ad nauseam by
others.' 0 Yet none of this impresses the Marxist-Leninist juris-
prudent, who simply quotes Lenin's fundamental rule of socialist
legal philosophy: "We have no more private law, for with us all
has become public law."" In the temporary "dictatorship of the
proletariat" prior to the onset of the idyllic classless (communist)
society, the law exists pragmatically as an instrument of socialist
policy;12 and following Lenin's ethic that the end justifies the
means,' 3 the disregard of due process and the consequent mis-
eries of political defendants and prisoners under the Soviet legal
system are straightforwardly justified as furthering state inter-
ests.
Or consider National Socialist legal operations in the Germany
of the 1930s and 1940s. After observing the situation in Nazi Ger-
many at firsthand, Dr. William Burdick of the University of Kan-
sas Law Faculty wrote in 1939:
It is a necessary part of the machinery of dictatorships that the law and
the courts shall be subservient to the ruler. In 1933, it was officially de-
clared in Germany that the final authority as to the principles of the State
and the law is the National Socialistic German Workers' Party; that no
other political party could be formed; and that the Fuehrer should make
its laws. Does this declaration differ in principle from the decree of Soviet
Russia stating that the "Socialist Conscience" shall be the final arbiter?
Today, in Germany all judges are not only appointed by the present gov-
ernment but they are also subject to dismissal by arbitrary power. As a
result, all Hebrew judges, of which there was a considerable number,
many of them being Germany's ablest jurists, have been dismissed from
all the courts. Moreover, this "purge" has not been limited to the judicial
profession, it has been extended to the lawyers also. In 1933, the former
German Bar Association was dissolved, and a National Socialist Lawyers
Society was established in its place. All its members must be of German
blood, and by official decree a person is not considered to be of German
blood if his parents or grand-parents have Jewish blood in their veins. It
was further decreed that all public officials of non-Aryan descent should
be retired. This included judges, lawyers, counsellors in administrative
law, consultants on cases in the labor courts, court officials, and candi-
dates in training for the judicial or legal professions. In 1933, twenty-seven
9. A. SOLZHENrrSYN, THE GULAG ARCHIPELAGO 1918-1956 pt. 1 (1974); ci. A.
SOLZHENrrSYN: CRITICAL ESSAYS AND DOCUMENTARY MATERIALS (1973).
10. E.g., INTERNATIONAL COMMISSION OF JURISTS, JUSTICE ENSLAVED: A COLLEC-
TION OF DOCUMENTS ON THE ABUSE OF JUSTICE FOR POLITICAL ENDS (1955).
11. See LENIN et al., Soviet Legal Philosophy passim in 51 20TH CENTURY LE-
GAL PHILOSOPHY SER. (1951); cf. R. DAVID & J. BRIERLEY, MAJOR LEGAL SYSTEMS IN
THE WORLD TODAY 157-58 (1968) [hereinafter cited as R. DAVID & J. BRIERLEY].
12. See J.W. MONTGOMERY, THE SHAPE OF THE PAST 74, 80, 217 (1963).
13. Cf. J. FLETCHER & J.W. MONTGOMERY, SITUATION ETHICS: TRUE OR FALSE 79,
82, 83 (1972).
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percent of all the lawyers in Berlin were of Jewish blood. Their citizen-
ship has been taken away and with it their right to vote. No additional
Jewish lawyers can be trained, because all Jews are now excluded from
the German universities.
1 4
As we are well aware, the sufferings of the legal profession in
Germany were paralleled at every level of the society, and in the
apocalyptic holocaust of the Third Reich six million Jews per-
ished.
After the Nazi defeat the blood of these victims cried out for
justice; war crimes trials were an inevitability. But what standard
was to be used at Nuremberg to judge the accused leaders of the
Nazi regime? When the Charter of the Tribunal, which had been
drawn up by the victors, was used by the prosecution, the defend-
ants very logically complained that they were being tried under
ex post facto laws; and some authorities in the field of interna-
tional law have severely criticized the allied judges on the same
ground.' 5 The most telling defense offered by the accused was
that they had simply followed orders or made decisions within
the framework of their own legal system, in complete consistency
with it, and that they therefore could not rightly be condemned
because they deviated from the alien value system of their con-
querors. Faced with this argument, Robert H. Jackson, Chief
Counsel for the United States at the trials, was compelled to ap-
peal to permanent values, to moral standards transcending the
life styles of particular societies-in a word, to a "law beyond the
law" of individual nations, whether victor or vanquished.
It is common to think of our own time as standing at the apex of civiliza-
tion, from which the deficiencies of preceding ages may patronizingly be
viewed in the light of what is assumed to be "progress." The reality is that
in the long perspective of history the present century will not hold an ad-
mirable position, unless its second half is to redeem its first. These two-
score years in this twentieth century will be recorded in the book of years
as one of the most bloody in all annals. Two World Wars have left a leg-
acy of dead which number more than all the armies engaged in any war
that made ancient or medieval history. No half-century ever witnessed
slaughter on such a scale, such cruelties and inhumanities, such whole-
sale deportations of peoples into slavery, such annihilations of minorities.
The terror of Torquemada pales before the Nazi inquisition. These deeds
are the overshadowing historical facts by which generations to come will
remember this decade. If we cannot eliminate the causes and prevent the
repetition of these barbaric events, it is not an irresponsible prophecy to
14. W.L. BURDICK, THE BENCH AND BAR OF OTHER LANDS 422 (1939).
15. E.g., G.A. Finch, The Nuremburg Trials & International Law, 41 Am. J.
INT'L L. 20 (1947); E. Borchard, International Law and International Organization,
41 Am. J. INT'L L. 106 (1947); cf. R. WORMSER, THE STORY OF THE LAW 557 (rev. ed.
1962).
say that this twentieth century may yet succeed in bringing the doom of
civilization.
Goaded by these facts, we have moved to redress the blight on the rec-
ord of our era ...
• . . at this stage of the preceedings, I shall rest upon the law of these
crimes as laid down in the Charter....
In interpreting the Charter, however, we should not overlook the unique
and emergent character of this body as an International Military Tribunal.
It is no part of the constitutional mechanism of internal justice of any of
the Signatory nations. . . . As an International Military Tribunal, it rises
above the provincial and transient and seeks guidance not only from In-
ternational Law but also from the basic principles of jurisprudence which
are assumptions of civilization .... 16
Thus have the horrors of our recent history forced us to recog-
nize the puerile inadequacy of tying ultimate legal standards to
the mores of a particular society, even if that society is our own.
To "redress the blight on the record of our era" demands nothing
less than a recovery of those "basic principles of jurisprudence
which are assumptions of civilization."
II. THE DILEMMA
But where are the basic principles of "higher law" to be found,
and how are they to be identified and justified? Voila, the great
dilemma: for however much our world cries out for absolute
standards of rightness, they seem forever beyond our grasp. Like
Ponce de Le6n's ciudad de oro, the permanent legal norms for
which we search appear always to lie on the other side of the next
mountain.
And yet, every day, in every court of the land, decisions are
handed down in reliance on "larger," "higher" principles which do
not themselves derive from precedent. H. L. A. Hart correctly ob-
serves that "because precedents can logically be subsumed under
an indefinite number of general rules, the identification of the rule
for which a precedent is an authority cannot be settled by an ap-
peal to logic." 17 The same point is made in detail by A. W. B.
Simpson, through analysis of the leading English tort liability
case of Rylands v. Fletcher18 (held: one is liable at his peril for
the natural and probable consequences of the escape of any po-
tentially dangerous thing which he has brought upon his land)
and its qualification in Nichols v. Marsland19 (held: defendant
16. Jackson, Closing Address in the Nuremberg Trial, 19 PROCEEDINGS IN THE
TRIAL OF THE MAJOR WAR CRIMINALS BEFORE THE INTERNATIONAL MILITARY TRIBU-
NAL 397 (1948). For valuable bibliographical references on the Nuremberg trial,
see W. BISHOP, INTERNATIONAL LAw 996, 1016-18 (3d ed. 1962).
17. Hart, Philosophy of Law, Problems of, 6 ENCYCLOPEDIA OF PHILOSOPHY 264,
270 (1967).
18. L.R. 3 H.L. 330 (1868).
19. 2 Ex. D. 1 (1876).
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not liable, since an extraordinary rain caused his reservoir to
overflow and flood plaintiffs land).
[W]hen, for example, the case of Nichols v. Marsland was distinguished
from Rylands v. Fletcher upon the ground that the escape was caused by
an act of God, the court's acceptance of this distinction did involve some
recognition of some justificatory principle of morality, justice, social policy
or common sense which was external to the law, and this will generally be
found to be the case when law is made. For though the making of law
may be justified by legal rules which permit the making of law by this or
that person upon this or that occasion, the content of the law which is so
made requires a different type of justification.2 0
But what is this "different type of justification"? We have just
seen that the precedents of the case law do not necessarily yield
it. As Bartley, C. J., argued in reversing a nisi pruis decision
based on a well established rule of accord and satisfaction in the
law of contracts: "When we consider the thousands of cases to be
pointed out in the English and American books of reports, which
have been overruled, doubted, or limited in their application, we
can appreciate the remark of Chancellor Kent, in his Commenta-
ries, that 'Even a series of decisions are not always evidence of
what the law is.' "21 Professor Corbin of Yale, who includes this
case in his standard text, Cases on the Law of Contracts, appends
to Bartley's opinion this question for the student: "A precedent
seems not to be conclusive. What is?"22 What, indeed?
Equity lawyers have tended to locate the "higher law" within
the sphere of chancery; yet legal history plainly shows that courts
of equity, though they have often corrected the rigidities and in-
justices of the law courts, are subject to parallel arteriosclerosis. 23
The legislatively minded and the devotees of the continental Civil
Law tradition see statutes as the modern way to introduce justice
into the fusty tradition created by anachronistic case law; but
statutory injustice and stupidity are at least as manifest as the
evils of bad precedent. (One thinks of a Kansas statute that
changed the meaning of Tr from 3.1416 to an even 3, and another
that declared: "When two trains approach each other at a cross-
ing, they shall both come to a full stop, and neither shall start up
20. Simpson, The "Ratio Decidendi" of a Case and the Doctrine of Binding
Precedent, in OXFORD ESSAYS IN JURISPRUDENCE (FIRST SER.) 148, 175 (2d ed. A.G.
Guest 1968).
21. Leavitt v. Morrow, 6 Ohio St. 71, 67 Am. Dec. 334 (1856).
22. A. CoRBIN, CASES ON THE LAW OF CONTRACTS 916 (3d ed. 1947).
23. Cf. A.V. DICEY, LAW & PUBLIC OPINION IN ENGLAND DURING THE 19TH CEN-
TURY 375-82 (2d ed. 1914, reissued 1962).
until the other has gone."24)
Other jurisprudents have attempted to penetrate behind case
law, equity, and statute to some fundamental notion capable of
supplying the needed permanent criterion of legal worth: Volan-
sky, operating in the French tradition, suggests the jural concept
of "good faith, '25 much in the spirit of our Uniform Commercial
Code, which places central emphasis on this same concept.26
Lord Radcliffe, in his 1960 Rosenthal Lectures, after admitting
that "you cannot hope to get Natural Law in at the front door,"
tries to get it in at the back by way of the principle of "public in-
terest" or "public policy."27 Yet like the ABA Code's notions of
"temperance," "dignity," and "the respect of society," these con-
cepts remain vague and undefined--open to all possibilities of
definition and redefinition by the society of the moment. What
standard of justice would the concept of "good faith" offer in a
Marxist-Leninist culture, where the end is held to justify the
means? Would we be satisfied with the justice of "public policy"
under National Socialism? In point of fact, such maximally gener-
alized legal notions are like the chameleon: they take their color
from the societal pattern and are incapable of arresting degener-
acy in the society at large or in the legal sphere in particular.
To compound the difficulty in the search for "higher law," some
of the most influential jurisprudents and philosophers of our time
have concluded that a solution to this problem is impossible in
principle. H. L. A. Hart, after perceptively distinguishing between
the "primary rules" of social obligation and the "secondary rules"
by which a structure of positive law is created, identifies the ulti-
mate secondary rule as the "rule of recognition"-the criterion by
which law is recognized to be such in a society. When the ques-
tion is raised as to the validity of a given society's rule of recogni-
tion (e.g., we might think of Nazi Germany's refusal to recognize
Jews as persons deserving of legal rights), Hart answers:
We only need the word "validity", and commonly only use it, to answer
questions which arise within a system of rules where the status of a rule
as a member of the system depends on its satisfying certain criteria pro-
vided by the rule of recognition. No such question can arise as to the va-
lidity of the very rule of recognition which provides the criteria; it can
neither be valid nor invalid but is simply accepted as appropriate for use
24. J.A. DUNCAN, THE STRANGEST CASES ON RECORD 183-84 (1940); cf. B.
WAREE, CuRiosrrEs JUDICIAIRES 385-98 (1859).
25. A. VOLANSKY, ESSAI D'UNE DEFINITION EXPRESSIVE DUE DRorr BASEE SUR
L'IDPE DE BONNE FOI (1930).
26. See U.C.C. §§ 1-203, 2-209, Comment 2, 2-305, Comment 6, 2-306, Comment 1,
2-309, Comment 5, etc.
27. LORD RADCLIFFE, The Law & Its Compass, in 1960 ROSENTHAL LECTURES,
Nw. U. SCH. OF L. 33, 57 (1961).




Thus, each society's ultimate legal foundations are uncriticizable,
since any criticism could only come from another society whose
rules of recognition have no more absolute validity than those of
the society being criticized.
Hans Kelsen argues in a similar vein that each legal system is a
hierarchial structure (Stufenbau), grounded in a basic norm
(Grundnorm). This basic norm gives coherence to the plurality of
legal principles in the system and keeps it from disintegration.
But the question as to the ultimate validity of the Grundnorm is
unanswerable.
It is of the greatest importance to be aware of the fact that there is not
only one moral or political system, but at different times and within differ-
ent societies several very different moral and political systems are consid-
ered to be valid by the men living under these normative systems. These
systems actually came into existence by custom, or by commands of out-
standing personalities like Moses, Jesus or Mohammed. If men believe
that these personalities are inspired by a transcendental, supernatu-
ral-that is a divine authority-the moral or political system has a reli-
gious character. It is especially in this case when the moral or political
system is supposed to be of divine origin that the values constituted by it
are considered to be absolute. If, however, the fact is taken into consider-
ation that there are, there were and probably always will be several differ-
ent moral and political systems actually presupposed to be valid within
different societies, the values constituted by these systems can be consid-
ered to be only of a relative character; then the judgment that a definite
government or a definite legal order is just can be pronounced only with
reference to one of the several different political and moral systems, and
then the same behavior or the same governmental activity or the same le-
gal order may with reference to another moral or political system be con-
sidered as morally bad or as politically unjust.2 9
The implications of such a viewpoint are patently horrifying
(Nuremberg trials are ruled out in principle and the foxes of this
world can eat the rabbits as a regular diet), but the logical
problems in establishing absolute legal norms are equally formi-
dable. How exactly can a given society or a given individual tran-
scend the values of the culture so as to arrive at standards of
absolute worth? In the 19th century, Soren Kierkegaard, the fa-
ther of modern existentialism, rightly castigated and ridiculed the
28. HL.A. HART, THE CONCEPT OF LAW 105-06 (1965); cf. Symposium: The Phi-
losophy of H.L.A. Hart, 35 U. CHI. L. REV. 1 (1967); Philosophies du droit anglaises
et americaines, 15 ARCHIVES DE PHILOSOPHIE DU DRorr 113, 179 (1970).
29. Lecture delivered by Hans Kelsen at the University of California, Nov. 20,
1962 (tape at Boalt Hall Library); cf. R.G. Decker, The Secularization of Anglo-
American Law: 1800-1970, in 49 THOUGHT 280, 292-93, 297 (1974); A.S. DE BUSTA-
MANTE Y MONTORo, Kelsenism, in INTERPRETATIONS OF MODERN LEGAL PHILOSO-
PHIES: ESSAYS IN HONOR OF ROSCOE POUND 43 (P. Sayre ed. 1947).
pretentious philosophical idealism of Hegel; was it conceivable,
he asked, that one man should be able to disengage himself from
the human predicament-shed his own skin-to the point of see-
ing the World Spirit of Reason carry the human race dialectically
to perfect freedom? Hegel had asserted that history would pass
through four "world-historical" epochs, concluding with the "Ger-
manic"; his perspective here turned out to be the product of the
rising German nationalism of his time, not a judgment of univer-
sal validity.30 But who-whether idealistic Hegelian, materialistic
Marxist, or realistic jurisprudent-could see all of history so as to
establish its total meaning, or survey and sift the universe of val-
ues so as to declare absolute legal and moral principle? As hu-
morist and lay "philosopher" Woody Allen succinctly put it: "Can
we actually 'know' the universe? My God, it's hard enough find-
ing your way around in Chinatown." 31
Contemporary analytical philosophers, though lacking in
Woody Allen's pungency of expression, have made the same point
with logical rigor. Wittgenstein, in his famed Tractatus, argued
that our societal and personal limits as human beings forever
keep us from producing absolute philosophies that are indeed ab-
solute: "The sense of the world must lie outside the world....
And so it is impossible for there to be propositions of ethics. Eth-
ics is transcendental."3 2 Metaphorically expanding on this theme
in his posthumously published "Lecture on Ethics," Wittgenstein
says: "[W]e cannot write a scientific book, the subject matter of
which could be intrinsically sublime and above all other subject
matters. I can only describe my feeling by the metaphor, that, if a
man could write a book on Ethics which really was a book on Eth-
ics, this book would, with an explosion, destroy all the other
books in the world." 33
To arrive at absolute legal standards, one would have to disen-
gage himself from the world and its limited standards and go
"outside the world" to a "transcendental" realm of values. Only
there could the "intrinsically sublime" hornbook be found. To be
sure, this is entirely in accord with common sense. Water does
not rise above its own level; why should we think that absolute
legal norms will arise from relativistic human situations? Archi-
medes said that if he were given a lever long enough and a ful-
crum outside the world he could move it. Quite right; but all
depends on a fulcrum outside the world. The very expressions
"higher law" and "law beyond the law" are suggestive of this, for
30. See J.W. MONTGOMERY, WHERE Is HISTORY GOING? 15-36 (1969).
31. W. Allen, My Philosophy, THE NEW YORKER, Dec. 27, 1969, at 25.
32. L. WITTGENSTEIN, TRACTATUS LOGICO-PHILOSOPHICUS §§ 6.41-6.421 (1971).
33. Wittengenstein, Lecture on Ethics, 74 PHIL. REV. 3, 7 (1965).
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they employ transcendental qualifiers. 34 The essential first step
in the quest for absolute legal norms is the recognition
that-however much we need them and want them-we will
never find them by building jurisprudential towers of Babel.
Rousseau, who did not generally display such philosophical per-
ception, formulated the dilemma with stark accuracy in his
description of the work of the legislator:
In order to discover the rules of society best suited to nations, a supe-
rior intelligence beholding all the passions of men without experiencing
any of them would be needed. This intelligence would have -to be wholly
unrelated to our nature, while knowing it through and through; its happi-
ness would have to be independent of us, and yet ready to occupy itself
with ours; and lastly, it would have, in the march of time, to look forward
to a distant glory, and, working in one century, to be able to enjoy in the
next. It would take gods to give men laws .... 35
III. THE SOLUTION
The traditional answer to the cruel dilemma of desperately
needing "higher law" yet not being humanly capable of creating
it, is Natural Law theory. The essence of this theory, which held
sway from classical Greek times to the French Revolution and
which is experiencing a significant revival today,36 is that absolute
ethical standards and fundamental legal rightness are implanted
in the human situation and can be discovered as the common ele-
ments in the moral codes and positive legislation of all men and
cultures. Such Natural Law was formerly regarded as a product
and evidence of God's hand in the world. In the words of Cicero:
"I find that it has been the opinion of the wisest men that Law is
not a product of human thought, nor is it any enactment of peo-
ples, but something eternal which rules the whole universe by its
wisdom in command and prohibition. Thus, they have been ac-
customed to say that Law is the primal and ultimate mind of God
34. Cf. I.T. RAMSEY, RELIGIOUS LANGUAGE passim (1957).
35. J.J. ROUSSEAU, CONTRAT SOCIAL bk. 2, ch. 7 (1762).
36. 'The revival of natural-law doctrines is one of the most interesting fea-
tures of current legal thought." Golding, Philosophy of Law, History of, in 6 ENCY-
CLOPEDIA OF PHILOSOPHY 254, 263 (P. Edwards ed. 1967). Cf. J. CHARMONT, LA
RENAISSANCE DU DRorr NATUREL (2d ed. 1927); C.G. HAINES, The Revival of Natural
Law Concepts, 4 HARV. STUDIES IN JURIS. (reprint ed. 1965) [hereinafter cited as
C.G. HAINES]; J. COGLEY, R.M. HUTCHINS et al., NATURAL LAW AND MODERN SOCI-
ETY (1966); F. CASTBERG, LA PHILOSOPHIE DU DRorr (1970). For a detailed expres-
sion of traditional Natural Law theory, see TH. JOUFFROY, COURS DE DROrr
NATUREL (5th ed. 1876).
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But what precisely is the "something eternal" in the laws of
mankind, and how is it to be distinguished from the merely
human, temporal, and ephemeral? This is a question of cardinal
importance, for unless a clear distinction can be made it will obvi-
ously be impossible to criticize any given positive law on the ba-
sis of something more fundamental: what is considered "eternal"
may turn out to be no more than "temporal" and thus subject to
the same difficulties as what is being criticized.
Here is the crux of the problem in all Natural Law thinking. If
the Natural Law is stated in typically classic terms-for example,
in the formula of the Justinian Code, "Honeste vivere, neminem
laedere, suum cuique tribuere" (live honestly, harm no one, give
to each his own) 38 -it is, as Harvard's C. J. Friedrich observes, so
"imprecise" that it does little more than to underscore the need
for "some kind of equity."39 When attempts have been made to
specify the Natural Law in more concrete terms, the results have
been either a listing of ethical and legal principles common to di-
verse cultures 40 (entailing the fallacious assumption, known as
the "naturalistic fallacy," that what is universal is necessarily
right) or an attribution of eternal value to positions, such as the
Roman Catholic condemnation of "unnatural" methods of birth
control, that are highly disputable. 41
The most sophisticated of current Natural Law thinkers-those
influenced by the analytical movement in philosophy-have been
able to identify certain fundamental, trans-cultural ethical and le-
gal demands imposed upon us by our humanity. L. H. Perkins ar-
gues, for example:
The use of language implies a commitment as much as life in society
does-a commitment to communicate, i.e., to use that language in a way
that others may understand if they too are users of that language; i.e., to
use that language properly. Thus, James has an obligation to follow
through on that promise he made to Smith, and so does an anarchist who
opposes the whole institution of promising-the obligation is built into the
language, which is built into the institution, and the institution is built
into nature by the fact that man is a political, i.e., an institutional,
animal .... 42
The reasoning here is impeccable, but it does not go beyond the
most general obligations (truth-telling, keeping pro-
37. M.T. CICERO, DE LEGIBUS bk. 2, ch. 4.
38. Cf. A. D'ENTREVEs, NATURAL LAw 22 (2d ed. 1970).
39. C.J. FRIEDRICH, THE PHILOSOPHY OF LAw IN HISTORICAL PERSPECTIVE 33 (2d
ed. 1963).
40. A useful list is provided in C.S. LEWIS, THE ABOLITION OF MAN 51 (1947).
41. Cf. J.W. Montgomery, How to Decide the Birth Control Question, in BIRTH
CONTROL AND THE CHRISTIAN 575 (W. Spitzer & C. Saylor ed. 1969).
42. Perkins, Natural Law in Contemporary Analytic Philosophy, 17 AM. J.
JuRis. 111, 118 (1972).
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mises)--obligations of a heuristic or necessitarian character that
are incapable of fleshing out the skeleton of Natural Law.43
Specifically, what kind of contractual obligations should be en-
forced at law? Promises by cannibals, based on adequate
consideration, to clean their plates? It should give pause that the
vague expression of the Digest, "Give to each his own," was in-
scribed in German translation (Jedem das seine) on the metal
doors leading into Buchenwald.44
In the Preface to his classic, The Revival of Natural Law
Concepts, Haines singles out this vagueness as the prime charac-
teristic of Natural Law theories: "Carlyle, in speaking of the
views of the Roman jurists on natural law, doubted whether any
of the lawyers had very clear conceptions upon the matter. As a
matter of fact all theories of natural law have a singular vague-
ness. . ."45 Is there any way of overcoming this fatal flaw? Con-
siderable aid in solving the problem comes from the approach
taken by a law-trained first century theologian in his confronta-
tion with Stoic philosophers. The Stoics had provided the basic
formulation of Roman Natural Law theory and it was from them
that the great classical thinkers (Cicero, Seneca, et al.) derived
their views on the subject.46 Thus, it is most instructive to ob-
serve an early corrective to the vagueness of these views.
[C]ertain Epicurean and Stoic philosophers encountered [Paul at Ath-
ens]. And some said, What will this babbler say? Others said, He seems
to be setting forth strange gods-for he had been preaching Jesus and the
resurrection to them. And they took him to the Areopagus, saying, May
we know what this new doctrine is of which you are speaking?...
Then Paul stood at the center of the Areopagus and said, You men of
Athens, I note that in all things you are too superstitious. For as I passed
by and beheld your devotions, I found an altar with this inscription: TO
THE UNKNOWN GOD. Whom therefore you ignorantly worship I declare
to you .... [T] he times of this ignorance God winked at, but now com-
mands all men everywhere to repent, for he has appointed a day when he
will judge the world in righteousness by the Man whom he has ordained,
and he has given assurance of it to all in that he has raised him from the
dead.4
7
43. Cf. G. Del Vecchio's argument that veracity constitutes a juridical obliga-
tion. G. DEL VECCHIO, LA JUSTICE-LA VERIT: ESSAIS DE PHILOSOPHIE JURIDIQUE
ET MORALE 173, 195, 231 (1955).
44. Personal observation of the author.
45. C.G. HAINES, supra note 36, at vii.
46. See T.E. HOLLAND, THE ELEMENTS OF JURISPRUDENCE 33 (13th ed. 1924); cf.
E. ZELLER, OUTLINES OF THE HISTORY OF GREEK PHILOSOPHY 209, 266 (13th ed.
1931); E. ZELLER, STOICS, EPICUREANS, AND SCEPTICS (1870).
47. Acts 17:18-19, 22-23, 30-31. It is noteworthy that in verse 28 Paul quotes
It is the conviction of the Apostle that natural religion-man's
search for ultimate values-is correct as far as it goes, but it does
not go far enough. This search arrives at some notion of ultimacy,
but its content is "unknown -and would always have remained
unknown if God in his mercy had not specifically revealed himself
in the biblical history of salvation which culminates in the death
and resurrection of Jesus Christ. "Whom therefore you igno-
rantly worship I declare to you." As applied to the issue of legal
values, the vague generalities of Natural Law are made concrete
and visible through a specific scriptural revelation of the divine
will for man:
oT& J v4'Log M' Mwucie'Wsg c'007, 77 XdpLS9 Kat 77
dA Ojcta SLa 'IqaoD Xp#a-roO TivTo.
(The law was given through Moses; grace and truth came through
Jesus Christ.) 48 Wittgenstein's "intrinsically sublime" book of
ethics actually exists; Archimedes' fulcrum outside the world is a
reality, so the world of human values can in fact be moved;49
Rousseau's "superior intelligence" as legislator is not a mere
ideal-and instead of being coldly "unrelated to our nature" and
without "experience of the passions of men," God himself entered
our midst, was "like us yet without sin,"50 and imparted to us the
true nature and fulfillment of eternal law.
But why should such a stupendous claim be accepted? And
what about competing claims to divinely revealed law, such as
that of the Moslems? 51 Admittedly, and students of the law ought
to be the first to recognize it, to make a claim is hardly to prove a
case; in the realm of ultimate values no less than in the sphere of
legal issues competing claims must be arbitrated by factual evi-
dence. It is precisely at this evidential point that the biblical rev-
elation stands vindicated in comparison with all other such
claims.52 Doubtless this is why so many great legal scholars have
been prominent apologists-defenders-of the biblical "higher
law." Space forbids an analysis of their arguments here except
Stoic philosophical poetry; the reference is almost certainly to Cleanthes' "Hymn
to Zeus"-text in ESSENTIAL WORKS OF STOICISM 51 (M. Hadas ed. 1965).
48. John 1:17.
49. Cf. Acts 17:6, where the early preachers of the gospel are referred to by
their opponents as "these who have turned the world upside down."
50. Hebrews 4:15.
51. R. DAVID & J. BRIERLEY, supra note 11, at 386: "... Muslim jurists and
theologians have built up a complete and detailed law on the basis of divine reve-
lation [the Koran]-the law of an ideal society which one day will be established
in a world entirely subject to Islamic religion."
52. See Montgomery, The Apologetic Approach of Muhammad Ali and Its Im-
plications for Christian Apologetics, 51 MusIMa WORLD 111 (1961) reprinted with
corrections in MONTGOMERY, FAITH FOUNDED ON FACT 81-99 (1978).
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for a brief mention of especially noteworthy examples: 53 Hugo
Grotius, the "father of international law," whose De veritate reli-
gionis Christianae (On the Truth of the Christian Religion)
(1627) stressed the reliability of the Gospel accounts of Jesus' life;
Simon Greenleaf, Royall Professor of Law at Harvard and the
greatest American authority on Common Law evidence in the
19th century, whose Testimony of the Evangelists54 establishes
the New Testament as documentary evidence acceptable to the
courts-admissible and competent relative to its substantive
claims concerning Jesus' person and work; J. N. D. Anderson, cur-
rently Professor of Oriental Laws and Director of the Institute of
Advanced Legal Studies in the University of London, whose
Christianity: The Witness of History and The Evidence for the
Resurrection55 demonstrate the facticity of Jesus' resurrection
from the dead, and with it the truth of his claim to be no less than
God incarnate and the soundness of his declarations that the Old
Testament law derives from God himself and faithfully reflects
the divine will.
When analyzed by the most rigorous standards of historical
scholarship and by the most exacting canons of legal evidence,
the accounts of Jesus in the New Testament are found to be the
very opposite of hearsay; they are primary-source records pro-
duced by eyewitnesses.5 6 "We have not followed cunningly de-
vised myths," the writers consistently maintain, "when we made
known to you the power and coming of our Lord Jesus Christ, but
were eyewitnesses of his majesty."57 If testimony is worth any-
thing-and our entire legal operation is nothing without it-then
the case for biblically revealed "higher law" is established not
merely by the preponderance of evidence required in civil actions
but to "a moral certainty, to the exclusion of all reasonable
doubt."5 8 The test was well stated by Shaw, C. J., in the classic
case of Commonwealth v. Webster: "[T] he circumstances taken as
53. For other important examples, together with detailed discussion of the ar-
guments briefly mentioned here, see J.W. MONTGOMERY, JURISPRUDENCE: A BOOK
OF READINGS passim (1974).
54. Available in reprint ed. from the Baker Book House, Grand Rapids, Mich.
55. These works can be obtained from, respectively, Tyndale Press, 39 Bedford
Sq., London, Eng. and Inter-Varsity Press, Downers Grove, Ill.
56. J.W. MONTGOMERY, HISTORY & CHRISTIANITY (1970); Montgomery, Legal
Reasoning & Christian Apologetics, CHRISTIANITY TODAY, (Feb. 14, 1975).
57. 2 Peter 1:16.
58. The classic formulation of T. STARKIE: 1 LAW OF EVIDENCE 478 (2d ed. n.p.
1833) (1st ed. n.p. n.d.); Cf. WIGMORE, TREATISE ON EVIDENCE § 2497. See also J.
a whole, and giving them their reasonable and just weight, and no
more, should to a moral certainty exclude every other hypothe-
sis."59 How precise is the application of this test to the evidential
case for "higher law" offered by the apostolic company? Jesus
"through the Holy Spirit gave commandments to the apostles
whom he had chosen-to whom also he showed himself alive af-
ter his passion by many infallible proofs .... ,,60
IV. BENEFITS TO THE PRODIGAL LAWYER
If revelational "higher law" can indeed be established as a per-
manent arbiter of the positive law, two questions remain: first,
what are its benefits? and, second, why has modern man-and the
modern lawyer in particular--departed from it?
The benefits of an explicit, divine standard of justice ramify
through all areas of human life. We shall mention here four of the
principal advantages of the biblical "higher law."
(1) An explicit, non-question-begging standard of absolute jus-
tice is provided, by which the evil laws of sinful men and of sinful
societies can be evaluated and corrected. No longer is one at the
mercy of the vague and undefined idealism of professional codes
or Natural Law theories, whose terminology ("honesty," "dignity,"
"temperance") can be twisted in virtually any direction. No
longer is one caught in the vice of societal standards-which can
(and do) deteriorate under the pressures of modern life. Why
should Jews and Blacks and members of other minority groups
receive equal protection under the law? Why was Nazi racism ju-
ridically damnable? Not because of our current American social
values-since these have no more permanence or absolute valid-
ity than those of other peoples-but because God almighty has
declared once and for all that He has "made of one blood all na-
tions of men to dwell on all the face of the earth" and that "there
is neither Jew nor Greek, there is neither bond nor free." 6 ' Thus
is human equality and legal standing regardless of race or color
established on the rock of "higher law," above the shifting sands
of cultural change. Thomas Mann has magnificently captured the
wonder and inestimable value of such revealed law:
[A]ll the people came before Moses that he might give them what he had
GAMBIER, MORAL EVIDENCE (3d ed. n.p. 1824) (1st ed. n.p. n.d.); A. BUCKNILL, THE
NATURE OF EVIDENCE (1953).
59. Commonwealth v. Webster, 59 Mass. (5 Cus.) 295, 52 Am. Dec. 711 (1850).
60. Acts 1:1-3. The scope of the present essay does not permit a comprehen-
sive statement of the evidential case for the Christian truth-claim, and the reader
is therefore urged to consult the specialized works on this subject cited in the im-
mediately preceding footnotes.
61. Acts 17:26; Galatians 3:28.
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brought: the message of Jahwe from the mountain, the tables with the
decalogue.
'Take them, 0 blood of my father," he said, "and keep them holy in
God's tent. But that which they say, that keep holy yourselves in doing
and in leaving undone. For it is the brief and binding, the condensed will
of God, the bed-rock of all good behaviour and breeding, and God wrote it
in the stone with my little graving tool-the Alpha and Omega of human
decency ... "62
(2) Biblically revealed "higher law" offers the only reliable
guide to personal and national health, and thus to the preserva-
tion of individual and corporate life. The clear pattern through-
out Scripture is that those who do God's will live and those who
flaunt his commands perish. The "thousand-year Reich" that idol-
atrously arrogated divine functions to itself and ignored God's re-
vealed law perished in a generation, "and great was the fall of it."
Blessed is the nation whose God is the Lord, and only those na-
tions and individuals who seek first God's kingdom and righteous-
ness will survive the pressures of a sinful world. "Higher law" is
needed not only for sound legal decision, but for the very preser-
vation of the legal system itself; flaunting God's law means the si-
multaneous collapse of society and of the positive law that
cements it together. Again, hear Thomas Mann's Moses:
"But cursed be the man who stands up and says: '[God's Command-
ments are good no longer.' Cursed be he who teaches you: 'Up and be
free of them, lie, steal, and slay, whore, dishonour father and mother and
give them to the knife, and you shall praise my name because I proclaim
freedom to you.' Cursed be he who sets up a calf and says: 'here is your
God. To its honour do all this, and lead a new dance about it.' Your God
will be very strong; on a golden chair will he sit and pass for the wisest
because he knows the ways of the human heart are evil from youth
upwards. But that will be all that he knows; and he who only knows that
is as stupid as the night is black, and better it were for him had he never
been born. For he knows not of the bond between God and man, which
none carl break, neither man nor God, for it is inviolate. Blood will flow in
streams because of his black stupidity, so that the red pales from the
cheek of mankind, but there is no help, for the base must be cut down.
And I will lift up My foot, saith the Lord, and tread him into the mire-to
the bottom of the earth will I tread the blasphemer, an hundred and
twelve fathoms deep, and man and beast shall make a bend around the
spot where I trod him in, and the birds of the air high in their flight shall
swerve that they fly not over it. And whosoever names his name shall spit
towards the four quarters of the earth, and wipe his mouth and say 'God
save us all!' that the earth may be again the earth-a vale of troubles, but
not a sink of iniquity. Say Amen to that!" And
all
the






(3) Together with the revealed law, Scripture imparts gospel,
thereby offering not only perfect standards but also merciful help
for a fallen race that continually violates them. Classical theol-
ogy distinguishes three "uses" of the law set forth in the Bible:64
the "political use" (law as the fundament of society, in the sense
in which we have just been discussing it), the "didactic use" (law
as a guide for the spiritual growth of the believer), and the "peda-
gogical use" (the law as "schoolmaster to bring us to Christ, that
we might be justified by faith"65). This "pedagogical use," which
Luther regarded as primary, is the law's function to show us how
far short we fall, as individuals and as nations, from the perfect
standard of God's will. Perhaps we have not literally violated the
commandments against adultery or murder, but Jesus tells us in
the Sermon on the Mount that lust or hatred are the spiritual
equivalents of such acts; 66 and "whoever shall keep the whole
law, and yet offend in one point, is guilty of all." 67 Thus, "all have
sinned and come short of the glory of God."68 But here the gospel
of God's free grace in Christ enters the picture: He came to earth
for us, took our guilt on Himself, died to free us from the death
we deserved, and offers restoration to all who come to Him in
faith.69 Luther drove this truth home in characteristically power-
ful words:
[Tjhis is the proper and absolute use of the law: by lightning, by tempest,
and by the sound of the trumpet (as on Mount Sinai) to terrify, and by
thundering to beat down and rend in pieces that beast which is called
man's opinion of his own righteousness. Therefore said God by Jeremiah
the prophet: "My Word is a hammer, breaking rocks." For as long as the
opinion of his own righteousness abides in man, so long there abides also
incomprehensible pride, presumption, security, hatred of God, contempt
of his grace and mercy, ignorance of the promises and of Christ.
70
Biblically revealed law thus destroys our self-image as just and
63. Id. at 62-63.
64. See MONTGOMERY, The Law's Third Use, THE SUICIDE OF CHRISTIAN THEOL-
OGY 423 (1970).
65. Galatians 3:24. The Greek word translated "schoolmaster" in the King
James version (ira5y oor: paedogogos) referred not to the teacher himself but to
the slave whose responsibility it was to take the pupil to the teacher.
66. Matthew 5:17 i.
67. James 2:10; cf. Matthew 5:48.
68. Romans 3:23.
69. John 3:16; Romans 5:6-8; 6:23; Ephesians 2:8-9.
70. M. LUTHER, In Epistolam S. Pauli ad Galatas commentarius (1531), in 40
WA [the standard, critical WEIMARER AUSGABE of the Reformer's writings] pt. 1 at
485. For an English translation of Luther's great Galatians Commentary, see P.S.
Watson's rev. (1956) of the Middleton ed. (cited passage at 299); see also M. Lu-
THER, SELECTIONS 141 (J. Dillenberger ed. 1961). Cf. C.F.W. WAITHER, THE PROPER
DISTINCTION BETWEEN LAW AND GOSPEL passim (1928).
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righteous persons and forces us to rely on God's mercy in Christ.
It gives us a true picture of ourselves, and teaches us not only jus-
tice but also mercy. Needless to say, these lessons are fundamen-
tal to the personal growth and maturity of men in general, and of
members of the legal profession in particular. Without learning
them, can the jurist ever pray, as all jurists should: "[N] ot a sin-
gle time in rendering judgment have I forgotten that I am a poor
human creature, a slave of error, that not a single time in sentenc-
ing a man has my conscience not been disturbed, trembling
before an office which ultimately can belong to none but thee, 0
Lord"?71
(4) In the face of the inadequacies and failures of even the best
of human justice, biblical revelation assures us of a Last Judg-
ment, where perfect justice shall be rendered. The entertaining
volume "Pie-Powder," Being Dust from the Law Courts, written
anonymously by J. A. Foote, K.C., contains the following anec-
dote:
There stands in the market-place of one of our Wessex towns a memo-
rial cross--not, indeed, ancient, and scarcely beautiful, but bearing an in-
scription which is still read at assize time with wonder and rustic awe. It
tells how one Ruth Pierce, of Potterne, did in the year 1753 combine with
three others to buy a sack of wheat, each contributing her share of the
price. When the money was collected a deficiency appeared, and each wo-
man protested that she had paid her full share, Ruth, in particular, declar-
ing that if she spoke untruly she wished that God might strike her dead.
Thereupon it is recorded that she instantly fell lifeless to the ground, and
the money was found hidden in her right hand. The inscription adds that
this signal judgment of the Almighty was commemorated by the direction
of the Mayor and Aldermen for the instruction of posterity....
... So have I, when passing from the market cross of Devizes to the As-
size Courts hard by, reflected how much more easily justice would be ad-
ministered if all perjury were cut as short as that of ill-fated Ruth.72
But "ill-fated Ruth" is hardly a common phenomenon, however
we explain it. "Justice is not only to be done; it is manifestly to
be done"; yet, as a matter of fact, it is often not done, manifestly
or otherwise. John Chipman Gray records the viewpoint, which
has occurred to all of us at one time or another, that it is "an ab-
surdity to say that the Law of a great nation means the opinions
of half-a-dozen old gentlemen, some of them, conceivably, of very
71. P. CALAMANDREi, EULOGY OF JUDGES 101 (1942).
72. J.A. FOOTE, "PIE POWDER," BEING DUST FROM THE LAW COURTS, COLLECTED
AND RECOLLECTED ON THE WESTERN CIRCUIT BY A CIRCUIT TRAMP 213-14 (1911, re-
printed 1967).
limited intelligence."73 Our legal systems suffer from the fallibil-
ity of the sinful human situation: absurdities are made law; guilty
men go free; innocent men are punished. But Holy Scripture
promises a Last Assize, when "there is nothing covered that shall
not be revealed, neither hid that shall not be known."74 The
Judge on that Day will be at the same time omniscient and just,
and the ambiguities and failures of human justice through history
will be rectified. Thus, the biblically revealed conception of
"higher law" offers eschatological hope: the promise that justice
is not in the final analysis sound and fury, signifying nothing.7 5
Scripture uses legal imagery to describe that Day, and stresses
that the only hope for the individual or nation before the bar of
eternal justice will be the services of the divine Advocate-Jesus
Christ-whose death alone can free men from their sins.76 His
services are available free, through faith. Every attorney should
therefore ponder, while he has the opportunity, the eternal impli-
cations of that well-known aphorism: "The accused who acts as
his own lawyer has a fool for a client."
Legal philosophy in modern times, however, has very largely
played the fool. In the terms of our introductory fable, it has cre-
ated the conditions for its own destruction: the jurisprudential
rabbit, by opting for moral relativity, has made himself a ready
dish for the opportunist foxes of the contemporary world of Real-
politik.
And how did this sad state of affairs come about? It has been
well said that in the 18th century the Bible was killed (by unwar-
ranted destructive criticism, as in Paine's Age of Reason); in the
19th century God was killed (Nietzsche's "death of God" and the
substitution of the Uebermensch, the Superman, who "transvalues
all values"); and in our 20th century Man has been killed (in the
most destructive wars in history). This degeneration is not acci-
dental; each step logically follows from what has preceded: the
loss of the Bible leads to the loss of God, for in the Bible God is
most clearly revealed; the loss of God leaves Man at the naked
mercy of his fellows, where might makes right.
A precisely parallel deterioration can be charted in the history
of jurisprudence:
73. J.C. GRAY, THE NATURE AND SOURCES OF THE LAW 84 (2d ed. 1921, reprinted
1963).
74. Luke 12:2-3.
75. See K. HEIM, JESUS THE WORLD'S PERFECTER: THE ATONEMENT AND THE RE-
NEWAL OF THE WORLD pt. 3 (1959); J.P. MARTIN, THE LAST JUDGEMENT (1963); and
especially M. BART, AcQrurrrAL BY RESURRECTION ch. 4 (1964).
76. 1 John 2:1; Romans 14:10-12; Phillipians 2:10.
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In General In Jurisprudence
18th century BIBLE REVEALED LAW
19th century DESTRUCTION OF: GOD NATURAL LAW
20th century MAN POSITIVE LAW
To the end of the Reformation period, jurisprudents grounded
positive law and natural law in biblical revelation-where the
clearest expression of God's revealed will for men could be found.
During the 18th century, efforts were made by Deists and others
to separate Natural Law from the Bible and to rely on "natural
rights" alone as the basis of human society and positive law.7 7
But by the 19th century a Natural Law independent of Scripture
had become so vague that it was readily replaced by "legal real-
ism," positivism, and other relativistic approaches. Then, in our
time, came the inevitable holocaust: if law is indeed relative, it
can be twisted in a totalitarian, revolutionary or anarchical man-
ner according to the desires of those in power, and becomes no
more than a tool of the party for effecting social change according
to whatever definition of social value or dysvalue happens to be
theirs.78 George Orwell's 1984 appears on the horizon, as does the
Antichrist of Scripture, significantly denominated i 6iooos--"The
Lawless One."7 9
Like Western man in general, the modern jurisprudent made
the fundamental error two centuries ago of thinking that human
values could be sustained apart from God's revelation of Himself
in Holy Scripture. An attempt was made to live off of the inher-
ited moral capital of the Bible after dispensing with it. Eventually
daddy's money ran out, and the modern lawyer now finds himself
77. Fortunately, our Founding Fathers (with the prominent exception of Jef-
ferson) did not consciously attempt to cut themselves off from their revelational
roots. See E.S. CORWIN, THE "HIGHER LAW" BACKGROUND OF AMERICAN CONSTrru-
TIONAL LAw passim (1955). In developing their views of "inalienable rights" and
social contract they followed not the deistic sentimentalist Rousseau but John
Locke, whose Christian beliefs were so firm that he wrote an apologetic on The
Reasonableness of Christianity; cf. C. BECKER, THE DECLARATION OF INDEPEN-
DENCE: A STUDY IN THE HISTORY OF IDEAS (rev. ed. 1942). Jefferson's antipathy to
Blackstone may well relate not only to the latter's political but also to his religious
conservation; see Waterman, Thomas Jefferson and Blackstone's Commentaries in
ESSAYS IN THE HISTORY OF EARLY AMERICAN LAW 451, 472-73 (D.H. Flaherty ed.
1969).
78. Cf. 'RADICAL LAWYERS: THEIR ROLE IN THE MOVEMENT AND IN THE COURTS
(J. Black ed. 1971).
79. 2 Thessalonians 2:8.
in a far country "filling his belly with the husks that the swine did
eat."80 But-Deo gratias!-the lights in the Father's house are
still burning, and a return to the "higher law" of Scripture is open
to all. The prodigal lawyer need only "come to himself," arise and
go to his Father, saying to him: "Father, I have sinned against
heaven, and before thee." The promise is that he will be received
with compassion: for this my jurisprudential son was dead, and
is alive again; he was lost, and is found.
80. Luke 15:16 f.
